Burden of Proof

The burden of proof of benefit for public works related to the World Cup and Olympics should fall on the government, not on civil society. What is happening in Brazil is that the master plans of cities have been altered to attend to the short term demands of Swiss-based NGOs, with the promise that the outpouring of tens of billions in public funds will generate short, medium, and long term benefits. Of course, the opening of public coffers for massive public project will inevitably generate jobs and secondary benefits for a limited range of social actors. However, the justifications (be they technocratic, economic, or geo-political/symbolic) for those projects and the ways in which they (ostensibly) fit into medium and long-term city planning mechanisms that will generate more just and livable cities are not in evidence at all. Herein lies part of the problem: mega-events, almost without exception, are predicated upon short term return on public investment for private industry – economic projections that indicate massive growth for small businesses are conducted by firms contracted to demonstrate just that. There is a farcical absence of independent economic analysis that justifies multi-billion dollar investments before these investments are made. The studies and reports that are coming out now about the World Cup and Olympics in Brazil are mechanism for justifying what is already underway. The inexorable, relentless carrying off of these projects at whatever cost, needs to be justified somehow. Much like the continual selling of various wars in the USA, the continual selling of mega-investment in Brazil is an exercise in public relations based in voodoo economics.

For readers new to this blog, I am attempting to cover the massive changes in Rio de Janeiro and Brazil from a perspective based in critical geography mixed with investigative journalism. That my comments here are almost wholly in opposition to the projects underway in Brazil is based on my decade of research into the ways that sports impact urban and social relations. There is a global tendency to de-politicize sports. No one likes to think of their leisure activity as yet another field of political action. However, everyone surely understands that the marriage of sports and nationalism in international competitions cannot be effectively separated from ideas of citizenship, notions of belonging, human rights, and the foundations of a global political-economy. The complications inherent to sport are multiplied and accelerated with the World Cup and Olympics, especially as they stimulate and accelerate myriad processes already present in the places / spaces in which they occur. Mega-events crystallize the articulations between the local and the national and the global wherever they occur, opening opportunities for the questioning of and resistance to the worrisome trends of social polarization and the implementation of ever more severe tactics of neo-liberal governance.

I changed the sub-heading of the blog to “Black Boxes and Trojan Horses” as an indication of the way I see these events unfolding. That the World Cup and (to a lesser extent) the Olympics operate in secrecy is no secret. We have yet to be presented with the governance structure of the 2014 World Cup. We don’t know how decisions are being made, just that there is little or no democratic input into the ‘system’ that is taking billions and restructuring cities and social relations, especially in relation to the use of public space, the installation of new security mechanisms, and the re-articulation of the right to the city. The Olympics have adopted a new governance mechanism that erects a non-governmental authority to direct the billions into project that are defined by the needs of the Games and not the city itself. That is to say, the city needs to be restructured to suit the Games, and not the other way around. I think there is something fundamentally wrong with this and am attempting to show how and where and when and why this is happening.

My comments are occasionally hyperbolic but always based in archival and field research that I am conducting. My interpretation of media reports and press releases is hopefully providing a different perspective into the euphoric vision of mega-events that dominates popular discourse. My ire and incredulity are not couched in anti-sport or anti-event rhetoric but rather come from my belief that the World Cup and Olympics are being used as opportunities to maximize capital accumulation opportunities in perverse and negative ways. The models currently being employed are simply not capable of bettering cities, making them more livable, more just places. Rather, the autocratic imposition of these events requires a restructuring of “democratic norms” in order to facilitate the transfer of public wealth to private hands. These are lost opportunities to implement projects that would bring lasting and not short term benefits.

These events need a massive restructuring, a dose of humility, and should attend to the demands of the places in which they are held. As it is, they are ever-larger, require ever-more public funds, and re-shape spaces and places to meet the exigencies of international sport federations and their corporate partners while stimulating real-estate speculation and re-enforcing false notions of “progress” and “social development”. Of course, the massive outlay of public money for these events is going to generate benefits, employment opportunities, and improvements in transportation, communication, etc. But shouldn’t these projects have long-term urban and social planning as their foundation? It is likely that without the events that the political consensus necessary for such a massive outlay would never be possible. However, the opportunity costs are extreme and rarely measured, if only because it is difficult to do so. But considering that the Brazilian federal government just cut R$50 billion from the education budget while it is projecting to spend at least R$60 billion on mega-events indicates that these costs are real and worth considering. 

Pos-Carnaval scattershot

Brazil is expensive. Everyone keeps saying it, we all keep paying it. Here’s an example from yesterday. I filled up a very small car with gas, R$104 (US$65, about six dollars a gallon in a country that doesn’t import oil and has its own refineries). Then, it was time to change the oil. The synthetic quarts, sucked out of the ground, processed, produced and sold in Brazil were R$39 each. That’s twenty dollars a quart of oil. The oil change set me back R$186. So, between filling up the car and getting the oil changed I spent R$290 or US$ 175. Not to even mention the cost of buying and maintaining cars here, nossa senhora.  If you can say carro caro five times quickly without having both words sound the same then you are probably used to such prices and don’t even think about it anymore.

Brazilians are getting more and more into debt as the consumer society expands. The front page of OGlobo’s Economia section from Sunday: Brazilians already commit 22% of their salaries to pay down debts. This is up from 13.9% in 2003. The banks in Brazil charge up to 180% per year for credit card debt, and for short term cash loans, the percentages can be even higher. The best possible business to have in Brazil is a bank. As people begin to borrow against the inflated values of their homes and apartments and buy more and more things that they didn’t even know they needed until they had someone offering just that very thing, then wow! When the bubble bursts in 2017(?), it will probably still be good to be in banking (as the recent experience in the USA has shown).

There is a direct correlation between occupying a foreign country and occupying Rio’s favelas. The Brazilian military has been leading the UN’s occupation of Haiti for many years and has used the strategies and tactics of that occupation in the military exercises in the Complexo do Alemão. Sensitive as ever to the cultural nuances of “indigenous people”, a Brazilian coronel was quoted as saying, “it doesn’t get to be an organized crime unit like in Rio. Violence happens here may times because it is a part of their culture.” (Não chega a ser uma organização criminosa como no Rio. A violência acontece aqui, muitas vezes, por fazer parte da cultura do povo.)  There are other comparisons to be made here between the USA and Brazil, but I will leave it to the reader to make those connections.

O’Bama is planning a visit to Rio for St. Patrick’s Day week. He’ll give a big public speech in Cinelândia. I’m trying to call this the “Visita d’Obama” but was told this is not grammatically correct. It’s the “Visita do Obama”, which for me is one too many O’s.

Dilma officially indicated Henrique Mirelles as the head of the APO (Autoridade Pública Olímpica). The former head of Brazil’s Central Bank will preside over an institution that was significantly reduced in size during the deliberations in the Senate. The APO went from 480 to 181 official posts. The Lula government was sparing no expense, for anything, but Dilma has had more fiscally responsible ideas in her head. Sergio Cabral and Eduardo Paes also wanted the APO to have reduced powers and they appear to have been successful in their negotiations with the federal government. I haven’t been able to find the revised text of the Medida Provisória 510, so if anyone out there has some time and inclination, I’ll update this post and give due credit!

Classes started this week. I’m teaching a course called “Producing the Olympic City” in the Master’s program of Architecture and Urbanism at UFF. If anyone wants to get on the blog, google group, or zotero send me an email and I’ll get you signed up. Falando nisso, se houver Brasileiros interessados em participar no curso, estou abrindo as portas para vocês! (BTW, for those of you not familiar with zotero.com, it’s perhaps the best thing ever invented for researchers, even though it only functions in Mozilla).

Oh no, more APO...

Today, the Brazilian lower house is taking up the possibility of reforming Provisional Measure 503/2010 (MP 503/2010) that may or may not create a new state agency to run the 2016 Olympic Games. Rio's mayor, Eduardo Paes, has been expressing his dissatisfaction with the measure which will take much of the power over Olympic construction out of his hands and put more powerful and qualified people than him in positions of power. According to today's small column in OGlobo, there does not appear to be much chance of changing MP 503/2010 as it has to be voted on before March 1. If the vote is delayed, the MP will die and Rio's Olympic project will be delayed for another few months (not necessarily a bad thing).

Apparently Dilma, Paes, and Rio state govenor Sergio Cabral are willing to let the measure die rather than create the new state agency. The creation of the Public Olympic Authority and the Brasil Sport Legacy [sic] Company (or BRASIL 2016), was a fundamental piece of Rio 2016's bid. It has been nearly a year and a half since Rio won the Olympic auction. While I agree that MP 503/2010 needs to be radically reformed, there has been no public discussion of the MP in Rio and there will be no mechanisms for civil society to participate in the decisions taken regarding the city's future. There are R$30 billion hidden agendas in this process, but if MP 503/2010 does not get voted upon, it may be just the opporutnity that Rio's social movements and public defenders need to get insert themselves into the hurricane of creative destruction that is making its way to South America.

The TCU report from last week didn't have any immediate or noticable effect on the CBF or the organization of the World Cup. Today I published a o a slightly revised version of last week's article regarding the TCU's findings about Brazil's 2014 World Cup preparations at The Shin Guardian, one of the leading footy websites in the USA:
http://theshinguardian.com/2011/02/22/brazil-stadiums-budgets-that-border-on-complete-fiction/

Coming soon: photos from a Paulista clássico, Santos (1) x Corinthians (3)

2016 Olympic Village apartments to cost R$400.000 each, to build...

The mega-builder Carvalho Hosken (one of the largest land holders in Barra de Tijuca the neighborhood where the majority of 2016 Olympic installations will be located), signed a contract today with Rio 2016 and the Rio city government to build the Olympic Village at a cost of R$1 Billion. Even without having fully negotated the terms of the loan from the Caixa Economica, Carvalho Hosken is set to build the 2.500 apartment residential complex.

The math is simple. One Billion divided by 2.500 = R$400.000. According to today's story, the "idea is to sell the apartments on the open market."

Looking back to the Pan American Games and the resulting emptiness of the Vila PanAmericana (which contrary to today's rosy reporting, has an occupancy level lower than 30% even though the majority of the apartments were sold after the Pan), we might be staring the same beast in the face. The VilaPan did not have sufficient financial backing, the scope of the project was reduced and the condominiums are mostly empty.

The head of Carvalho Hosken said of the 2016 Olympic Village "if I feel like I'm not going to be able to complete the project, I'll tell Nuzman (head of Rio 2016) and give up on the project." Great. So if C.H. can't finish the Olympic Village for a BILLION reales, then he'll give up and force someone else to take over at the last minute? Imagine what the average price for one of the apartments will be after this happens...R$500.000, R$600.000? This will certainly solve the grave housing crisis in Rio de Janeiro.

While this is going on, the Rio city government is ticking off a list of 119 favelas to be removed in the lead-up to the games. Many of these are within sight of the future Olympic Village. The Tribunal das Contas da União, responsible for monitoring government spending is going to have its work cut out for it. They still haven't finished processing people for the PAN 2007.

In other news, the Communist Party of Brasil (CPdoB) has begun to insist that the current Minister of Sport, Orlando Silva, maintain his post and not be shuffled over to head the Autoridade Publico Olímpico, the parallel government that will be responsible for building the Olympic City. We have already seen the ousting of Ricardo Leyser from the position of CEO of BRASIL 2016 (the private company that will be contracted  by the APO on a no-bid basis). Are the deck chairs being shuffled because the stink of the PAN is still heavy around all these Olympic insiders? Or is there a genuine effort to find people who are qualified for the job?

Two weeks away = massive update

Two weeks away from the daily tumult of Rio has left me with a pile of newspapers and magazines to read, some articles to write, and a need to catch the English-language world up on what has been happening in relation to the city, the World Cup and the Olympics.

To reiterate the general point of all of my commentary and critique of these events: there is no way to separate the production of mega-events and the production of urban space.

In Rio de Janeiro, the demands of the World Cup and Olympics have become the de-facto city plan. From transportation, to security, to stadiums, to hotels, to communications, airports, etc. the complex socio-spatial-economic-political exigencies of these events are pushing from the top down, restructuring space and society. The end goal is to accelerate flows of capital, information, people, goods, and more capital – imagining, imposing, and leaving behind a matrix of power relationships that articulate in urban space. These complex restructurings are happening in a compressed time frame – it’s as if no one in Rio de Janeiro government has thought of the year 2017, much less 2028, or 2042 when we will still be living with the impacts of the interventions that are taking place now.

In reading through the last two weeks of OGlobo to catch up on what I’ve missed, I understand that one of the critiques of this kind of analysis will be that I am reading too much into a single news source that is unabashed in its approval of all things mega-event. I also recognize that by focusing on these top down interventions that I am probably reinforcing their power by drawing attention to them in lieu of highlighting the bottom-up forces arrayed in opposition to the projects.Oh well, critique away. I'll get to the resistance soon enough. 

Olympic Update:

In my post entitled The Olympic Shell Game, I outlined the plans of the COB and Brazilian government to erect a parallel governmental structure to construct and conduct the Olympic Games. This parallel government was given life by President da Silva through two Medidas Provisórias (Provisional Measures) that if approved by the Brazilian Senate would have the force of law. In a tiny column on 23.9.10 (p.23), Luiz Magalhães reported that the senate failed to vote on the measures which cannot be taken up again in the same legislative year in which they were submitted.

This appears to be a big, big problem for the Rio 2016 OCOG, but a potential opportunity for civil society to stick their noses in where they belong. What this means is that there is currently no organizing structure to carry off the games beyond the cabal headed by Carlos Nuzman. The closed, opaque, and autocratic head of the Brazilian Olympic Committee (COB), is also the head of Rio 2016, the first time in Olympic history that the same person has occupied both positions. This absurd concentration of power in one person has already revealed its true nature and received a very public rebuke. Here’s what happened:

Rio 2016 sent out a call for proposals for architectural plans for the Autódromo Nelson Piquet, the epicenter of the 2016 Olympics (and site of the Vila Autodrómo, whose struggle against forcible removal by the city government I covered here). The problem was that they only gave an opening of 16 days for firms to submit proposals for a project with a budget of R$ 216.4 million. The Institute of Brazilian Architects (IAB) raised a stink, and after some major coverage in OGlobo and pressure from the city government (and probably the IOC), Rio 2016 cancelled the call for proposals.

In reaction to this absurd episode (which was not accidental, but likely an attempt to steer the contract to one of Nuzman’s “friends” who had no doubt been preparing a proposal behind the scenes for some time), the mayor of Rio, Eduardo Paes is preparing a document requiring all Olympic projects to be cleared through four separate organs of  city government (Urbanism, Environment, Transportation, and Architecture and Urbanism). Can you say engarrafamento burocrático? Rio 2016 did the right thing by canceling the call for proposals. This is the first instance of a major reaction by the press and the IAB and the democratically elected government against Rio 2016. Let’s hope there were some lessons learned. 

So even though the Senate did not vote on the MPs creating the APO and BRASIL 2016, we can see that the foxes are going to have the keys to the hen house. The minister of sport, Orlando Silva, who was going to assume the presidency of the APO named Ricardo Leyser as the president of BRASIL 2016. Leyser, for those unfamiliar with the scandals of the 2007 Pan American Games, is still under investigation for his role in diverting hundreds of millions of R$ and generally botching the financing.Silva was in charge of the games themselves and Nuzman was head of the Organizing Committee. Same people, same roles, more money, different result? I don't think so. 

To confirm the general sensation that there is a gross lack of communication, organization, and competency between the agencies responsible for pulling off Brazil’s mega-events, on 22.9.10, President da Silva launched a Medida Provisória para o Esporte de Alto Rendimento (MP for high performance sport), designed to push Brazil into the top ten in medal counts in 2016. This MP is going to direct 2% of the national lottery to the COB which will then direct it to the various federations (a distribution system that has come under scrutiny by the government on more than one occasion). Incredibly, neither the COB or the national sport federations had any idea what the legislation was or about or that it had even been put forward by the national government. One would think that the Ministry of Sport would have some knowledge of these things and that because all of these people are in bed together that the communication would be more fluid. Perhaps the plan for medals is that silence is golden and no plan is a good plan. 

Jogos Militares:

I haven’t covered the 2011 World Military Games much on this blog, but they’re happening in Rio next July. The Military Games will be concentrated in the western suburb of Deodoro, bringing together six thousand athletes from 110 countries in fifteen sports. The Brazilian delegation has a number of Olympic athletes who are “joining” the armed forces for a little while. Brazil is far form the only country to use this tactic. The Military Games are considered a test for Rio’s mega-event capacity.

On the 16^th and 17^th of September, OGlobo reported that the organizing committee of the Military Games is under investigation by the Ministério Publico Militar  as well as the Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU) for awarding contracts without competitive bidding, irregularities in the construction of Games housing, sidestepping laws requiring projects to be evaluated by IPHAN (Institution of National Historical  and Artistic Patrimony), and possible contractual fraud with military engineering institutions. It’s not so bad, the budget for the Military Games is only around R$1.2 billion. I’ll be heading out to Deodoro in the coming weeks to get a first hand look at the Military Games installations and will report back with more information.

World Cup 2014:

Finally, finally, someone released photos of the Novo Maracanã. The demolitions have begun, but the Prefeitura has not yet approved the project as a whole, due to a series of bureaucratic necessities. As with most mega-events, and as was the case with the 2005-2007 reforms, the Maracanã project has begun without a plan. It happens so frequently that it must be the plan. 

Here’s the origin of some of the confusion: The state Secretary of Sport and Leisure, Marcia Lins, is in charge of SUDERJ (Superintendecy of Sports),which is in charge of the Maracanã. EMOP (Empresa de Obras Públicas) is responsible for public works and for providing construction services, and the municipal Secretary of Urbanism has to authorize the project vis a vis their coordinator for the licensing of special projects. There is a private firm that won the construction bid (RIO 2014) that has to pass the architectural designs through IPHAN, the preifeitura’s agencies, and the state government. These agencies all have to answer to the CBF and the 2014 Organizing Committee, which are in turn answering to FIFA, who answers to no one but global circuits of capital. So who is in charge of the Novo Maracanã project? Who knows. How much will it cost? Is anyone paying attention?

Jerome Valcke, secretary-general of FIFA,  blessed the Cidade Maravilhosa with a visit. He was here to check out places to install FIFA’s 2014 headquarters. Starting in 2011, Valcke is going to be living in Rio. He’s one of the few that won’t have much trouble affording an apartment in a city that has seen real-estate prices double since the announcement of the Olympics. 

The World Cup is being used as the final date for investments, creating the sensation that the event is stimulating everything that has to do with Brazilian economic growth. Two article headlines from the past two weeks: “Cabral: R$137 billion for Rio until 2014” (17.9.10); “R$ 3 billion for innovations until the World Cup”(14.9.10). These kind of headlines are typically completely unrelated to the articles that follow and are part of OGlobo’s (and global media’s) larger project of attributing economic benefits to an event that is wholly funded by the public. The idea that these kinds of investments are going to benefit the public at large is the same empty promise as Regan’s trickle-down economics. This contradiction is evident within the paper itself, as to the side of the second headline is this: “Player arrested with false passport.” The continuing exploitation of young players by unscrupulous agents is the very base of the profits that drive the global political-economy of football.

What is happening economically is that mega-events are bringing sales events to Rio. Last year I reported on the Expo-estadio. This year, Rio is receiving Sports Events as well as SoccerEx. The goal of the events, as reported on 19.9.10, is to exploit glowing economic by institutions paid by the ministry of sport, that suggest that the 2016 Olympics are going to generate R$102 billion for Brazil. In my cautious estimation, I think the 2016 Olympics will cost at least R$60 billion. When we include the investments for the World Cup, Pan 2007, etc. the cost to the public will be around $100 billion. Granted much of this investment is necessary, and I am working on teasing out the various fonts, agencies, projects, that are combining to produce the spaces and places for maximum capital accumulation through mega-events.

Urban changes:

There are massive changes underway in Rio’s urban and social systems as preparations are made to host the coming mega-events. These interventions are not accidental or random in the way that the confusion surrounding the stadium projects is. Rather they are intended to discipline urban-social relations through increased policing, or to open up corridors to accelerate flows of people, goods, and information (which means money, money, money).

On 16.9 Oglobo reported on Operation Hooligan, which targeted members of the torcidas ogranizadas of Vasco and Flamengo, arresting nine for a laundry list of crimes. The three month investigation involved 160 police who monitored Orkut trying to find where the torcidas would stage their battles in public space. Several weeks ago, a Vasco fan was killed after the game against Fluminense by a tire iron. The head of the Vasco torcida Forca Jovem has suffered several attempts on his life. Threats of violence are so severe that the Fla-Flu clássico only had 15,000 spectators (which of course has to do with the problematic access to the Fechadão).

One of the responses to the problem of fan violence is on the same page. An article entitled “New Delegation Against Disorder” reports the creation of the Delegacy for Public Order. The chief of the civil police called it a “process of combat and cleaning to get rid of the bandits that infiltrate the torcidas organizadas. We are a city that is going to host the World Cup and Olympics and we can’t be like this. We are going to bring peace to the public.” Ok. No problem with bringing peace to the public, but how about addressing the cause and not the symptom?

The announcement of the “Pentagon Carioca” confirms the idea that certain areas of the city are being transformed into defensible fortresses while others are being left to fend for themselves. This building will be the control center for all of Rio’s emergency services and will concentrate eight organs from three spheres of government: Policia Militar, Corpo do Bombeiros, Guarda Municipal, Defesa Civil, CET-Rio, Polícia Rodoviária Federal, and the Rio version of 911. The concentration of information and firepower as well as emergency services is one of the guarantees made by the organizing committees of the World Cup and Olympics to FIFA and the IOC. The article points out that the group that put the design together traveled the world in search of models. This included a stop in New York, where they hopefully learned at least one lesson from that city. Don’t put the coordinating agency of your city’s emergency services in a place that is likely to be attacked!

In the Olympic zone in the south-west of the city, the implementation of staggeringly ambitious transportation projects that continue to depend on the internal combustion engine, petroleum, and wheels is underway (17.9.10, p.22). The widening of the Avenida das Americas is going to cause the destruction of 30% of the buildings along its path and 70% are going to lose their frontage. People are complaining. No one was consulted. The bulldozers are there, doing their thing. Customers will be lost, home owners are not being justly compensated. There is something very familiar about all of this.

Today, there was an article that lamented the 40% increase in the number of cars on the roads in Rio in the last five years. When I compared the number of pages of actual news with the number of pages and classifieds for auto sales, guess which was bigger? I suppose it’s one way to keep the inexorable march to a doomed consumer society marching forward, which will eventually sell more newspapers, but does no one see the direct relationship between rezoning urban space to produce massive Miami style condominium complexes, an advertising section for cars that is bigger than the rest of the paper combined, and Rio’s chronic traffic problems? At least there was an article on the 21^st that prophesied 10% fewer buses on the roads by 2012 (p.16). Gee, that will really help once the fleet of cars increases by another 20%, especially as the “special bus lanes” will mean fewer lanes for all those cars.

And last but not least, the march of the UPPs continues with “Next stop: Mangueira and Macacos” (18.9.10, p.25). Mangueira is significant because it sits directly across from the Maracanã. Macacos is more problematic as it is larger and is where the now infamous helicopter was shot down last October. On the same page, the inaguratoin of the UPP in the Morro de Salgueiro did not have the customary festive atmosphere because three MPs assigned to that UPP have been killed in the last week.

Two weeks away and I only covered a fraction of what’s been going on, from one news source. It's a complicated mess and if you've read this far you'll be interested in the upcoming International Conferrence Mega-Events and the City, 3-5 November at UFF in Niteroi. 

The Olympic Shell Game (O jogo do bicho olímpico)

As I have mentioned in numerous posts and interviews, part of the process of hosting a mega-event is the restructuring of space and re-presenting culture in order to accelerate flows of capital, goods, information, and people. “Inefficiencies” are structured out of the city, “strategic areas” are “regenerated”, and “urban legacies” left behind. City, state, and national governments promise massive urban and social interventions, signing contracts with international sporting federations that take precedence over social contracts with the local population, even though it is the latter group that is footing the bill. The current model of mega-event production is broken. The World Cup and Olympics are guaranteed to leave behind sporting, tourist, and urban infrastructures that have little or no post-event utility, do not attend to the basic needs and priorities of locals, and waste a singular opportunity to shape urban space and culture in a way that will create a more just and livable society. We are in need of Olympic-lessness, not events that are ever bigger and more transformative.

Brazil 2014 and Brazil 2016 will be corrupt, non-transparent mega-events that will cost hundreds of billions of dollars, exacerbate existing socio-economic divides, and leave behind acontextual, redundant, and under-used sporting, tourist, and urban infrastructures. Among the many reasons for this chronicle of a failure foretold is the fact that Brazil receives only 5 million tourist visits a year. Poland receives 15 million. Bulgaria receives 5.2 million. Bulgaria! The obvious solution is to move Brazil closer to North America and Europe, eliminate the tourist visa, or not spend one billion reales in stimulus to construct hotels for which there will be no post-event demand. With that kind of money you could fly in another million tourists. The results from Athens 2004 and South Africa 2010 should be warning enough. Alas, in Brazil the federal government has made it ever easier to build on a massive scale while creating complex legal structures to ensure the total opacity of the process.

In May, President Lula signed into law Provisional Measure 488/2010, giving birth to Empresa Brasileira de Legado Esportivo S.A. - BRASIL 2016 (The Brazilian Sport Legacy Company Ltd. – BRASIL 2016). On the same day, he signed Provisional Measure 489/2010, creating the Autoridade Pública Olímpica – APO (Public Olympic Authority). These two institutions will be directed by the Conselho Público Olímpico (Public Olympic Council -CPO). These new institutions will use the legal measures outlined in the Olympic Act (Lei nº 12.035/2009) along with their exceptional powers to “transform” Rio de Janeiro into an Olympic City. How will this work?

The federal government will pass R$29 billion to the CPO, comprised of the president of the republic, the governor and mayor of Rio de Janeiro “or their representatives”. The CPO can decide whether or not to extend the life spans of the APO and BRASIL 2016 past their 12/31/18 death date (kind of like the mutants in Bladerunner). The CPO will pass the money along to BRASIL 2016, which will then pass it along to the APO, which will then pass it along to contractors that do not have to go through a public bidding process in order to receive contracts with public money. Neither BRASIL 2016 or the APO will be required to hire their employees through the normal legal channels. All goods imported for the Olympic and World Cup projects are exempt from tariff duties (especially aggravating when it will cost me R$275 to liberate my birthday package from the mail room). By the time a contractor starts to work on a project, the money will have passed through three inter-connected yet independent organizations, none of which will have non-governmental auditors. Just to get the APO up and running will cost R$94,8 million. In Brazil, money does actually grow on trees but you have to cut them down to get it.

The APO is responsible for the creation and delivery of the Caderno de Encargos Olímpicos (CAPO – Olympic Projects) which the agency alone defines. These projects are highly varied, and in many cases assume the responsibilities normally undertaken by state agencies. The APO is not required to have liaisons with any state agencies, becoming a form of urban governance unto itself. This ensures that the APO will become the agency that is planning the city for the next generations. Will they hire urban planners? Will the total autonomy from democratic process facilitate the development of strong community relations? Will the lack of accountability in awarding contracts ensure a more transparent expenditure of public funds? Once BRASIL 2016 and the APO expire, to what government agency will citizens be able to turn to register complaints or search for answers? How many of the people who were in charge of the massively over budget, non-transparent 2007 Pan American Games will be directing these agencies? How will these extraordinary powers be used as we get ever closer to opening ceremonies? Will Ricardo Teixeira, president of both the CBF (Brazilian Football Federation) and the LOC (Local Organizing Committee) ensure that public money does not go into his private organization? Will Carlos Nuzman, president of the COB (Brasilian Olympic Committee) and Rio 2016 (which has an uncertain yet continuing role in all this) ensure that his business relationships are not going to benefit from the opacity of the Olympic Structure? Will the government site dedicated to monitoring Olympic Projects (http://www.transparenciaolimpica.com.br/ ) ever have information that is worth looking at?

Perhaps in anticipation of the answers to these questions, the Ministry of Sport is planning on spending between R$15-R$22 million per year to improve its image.

The deployment of provisional measures in addition to the alteration (or suspension) of national, state, and city laws in order to “prepare” Brazil to host sports mega-events highlights the radical nature of these events.

The IOC and FIFA make demands, Brazil bends over backwards to meet them. The clock is running and badly needed investments in health, education, and public transportation get bypassed for new priorities.  The government, in fealty to slick criminals, makes new laws, grants exemptions, and creates a parallel government that will take public money, have little or no accountability (either financial or democratic), and then once the games have passed, will simply disappear. As I mention in my article in the Journal of Latin American Geography, this is similar to what happened during the USAmerican invasion of Iraq with the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The CPA went in after a total “restructuring” (Shock and Awe), changed all of the laws and then evaporated. Here, the Shock and Awe comes in a different, somewhat less violent form, but the idea is the same: restructure space and culture for the maximization of profit.