This is the most important weekend of football in Rio de Janeiro in many, many years.
Rio de Janeiro has many dozens of professional teams, but four major clubs: Botafogo, Fluminese, Flamengo and Vasco da Gama. This is the final weekend of the Campeonato Brasileiro Serie A, or Brasileirão.
Botafogo is in the relegation zone, playing at home against Palmeiras (São Paulo). If Botafogo wins, they escape relegation. If they lose, they go down to the second division for the second time in five years. In addition to being the team with the most draws (14) they are widely perceived to be the team most harmed by bad luck, poor referring, and general levels of incompetence on the part of club management (despite receiving a massive subsidy from the city for their stadium contract). Palmeiras is three points off the title chase and win might give them the title if other results go their way. They will come with everything they have especially since they were leading the competition by six points six weeks ago, have spent hundreds of millions on transfers, and have very little to show for it.
Three months ago, the odds of Fluminese falling to the second division were 97%. Since the return of their talismanic striker Fred, they have won ten league games on the trot while getting to the final of the Copa SulAmericana. Flu sit one point ahead of both Coritiba and Botafogo and a draw will be enough to keep them in the Brasilieirão. Fluminese plays Coritba for the right to stay in the first division. After losing a heartbreaking final to LDU of Ecuador on Wednesday night they might not have the spirit to stay afloat. If they fall, Rio’s oldest club might not return to the first division for some time.
15
Fluminense
45
37
11
12
14
48
55
-7
16
Coritiba
44
37
12
8
17
47
59
-12
17
Botafogo
44
37
10
14
13
50
57
-7
18
Santo André
41
37
11
8
18
45
57
-12
19
Náutico
38
37
10
8
19
48
70
-22
20
Sport
31
37
7
10
20
48
67
-19
Flamengo are the unlikely story of the 2009 season. In August, they sat in 12th place with not much hope of reaching a continental competition. Since the inclusion of the 37 year old Dejan Petkovic in the starting lineup, week in week out, Flamengo have been the best team in Brazil. Petkovic has been brilliant, combining with ‘O Imperiador’ Adriano and Ze Roberto for some memorable goals. Flamengo idol turned manager Andrade has pulled all the right strings and is about to bring a massive party to the Maracanã.
Flamengo is in first place by two points chased by Internacional of Porto Alegre, Palmeiras and São Paulo. If Inter win and Flamengo lose, Inter will be champion. Problem for Inter: Flamengo is playing Grêmio of Porto Alegre, their arch-rival. Last week the fans of Grêmio began to chant ‘entrega’ to their team, meaning: lose the game intentionally, giving the title to Flamengo so Inter won’t win. It appears that this is going to happen and that a Flamenguista title is a faitaccompli.
P
Equipes
PTS
J
V
E
D
GP
GC
S
1
Flamengo
64
37
18
10
9
56
43
13
2
Internacional
62
37
18
8
11
61
43
18
3
Palmeiras
62
37
17
11
9
57
43
14
4
São Paulo
62
37
17
11
9
53
42
11
Rio’s soccer fans have not had much to cheer about in recent years. In recent years, Fluminese fell as far as the third division, Botafogo was relegated in 2004, and Vasco was relegated in 2008. Flamengo, with the largest fan base in Brazil (if not the world) is disputing the title for the first time in 17 years. A Rio team has never won the championship in the era of pontas corridas (running table of points). This in itself speaks volumes about the management of football in this city.
The seasons of Flu and Fogo will be a success if they aren’t relegated. Vasco was champion of the second division and will be retuning to top flight football in 2010. Flamengo is probably going to waltz into the championship because Gremio is going to abria as pernas (as they say) so that their cross-town rivals have no chance at the title. One victory, two escapes?
Not everyone in Rio de Janeiro is excited about the 2016 Olympic Games.
Residents of the Vila Autódromo, on the shores of LakeJacarepaguá, gathered on a recent Sunday afternoon to launch an international campaign to save their community. They are mobilizing against the forced removal of their homes in the face of development projects for the 2016 Olympic Games. The Resident’s Association of Vila Autódromo is sending a petition to President da Silva and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, demanding that their constitutional and human rights be respected.
Within 24 hours of Rio’s conquest of the 2016 bid, mayor Eduardo Paes made quite clear that the Vila Autódromo would be demolished to make way for the Olympic Media Center. Since then, the city council has enacted several zoning laws making exceptions to city law in order to stimulate real-estate investment in this booming region of the city. The Vila Autódromo has long been a target of developers and their resistance to forced relocation has been a particular annoyance to the mayor.
The community meeting gained a national profile through the presence of Edson Santos, Special Secretary of Politics for the Promotion of Racial Equality. Secretary Santos, previously a Rio city council member and federal deputy, was surprisingly sharp in his criticisms of the 2016 Organizing Committee noting that the promise of the Olympics had set off a boom in real estate speculation that was destined to turn the Barra de Tijuca region into a new Copacabana. That is, a formerly bucolic setting with disperse settlements of fishermen is designed, in accordance with new zoning laws, to become congested with condominiums and shopping malls in anticipation of the Olympic Games.
Inalva Mendes Brito has always been at the forefront of the community’s struggle to secure their constitutional rights. She penned a letter of protest outlining the resistance of the Vila Autódromo against forced relocation, a battle the community has been fighting since the 1990s. It was her invitation that brought Secretary Santos from Brasilia to Jacarepaguá where he encouraged the community to “create a restrictive environment” for the municipal government to act through protest, occupations, and organized resistance. “Rio can’t pay the bills for the kind of speculation that brings profit to the few,” the Secretary continued, “to what city does the Olympics belong?”
The forty residents attending the meeting enthusiastically received the Secretary’s comments, while organizers circulated through the crowd making sure that everyone had signed the petition.Children ran about in the playground where a high wall marks the edge of the Autódromo Nelson Piquet.
Once the Secretary had signed the petition, Sra. Brito and Altair Antunes Guimarães, president of the Residents Association of Vila Autódromo, took turns invoking their constituency to action. “Without the constant force of the community, we will lose this battle,” intoned Guimarães. This echoed Secretary Santos’ thoughts, “This is not going to be easy, the forces aligned against you are powerful. However, it is not acceptable to forcibly remove a community of peaceful, working people.”
The battle for the Vila was nearly lost in 2006 when the Secretary of Housing marked all of the community’s homes for demolition. The community lived on because of political pressure from a minority of council members and a supposed lack of funding. The majority of the residents have legal land title and a community history that extends back to the mid 1970s when the Autódromo was constructed.
The project to remove the Vila Autódromo is but one of several forced removals underway in preparation for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games. In addition to the Vila, the communities of Canal do Anil, Gardênia Azul, Parque da Panela, Metrô-Mangueira (near the Maracanã) e Belém-Belém (near the Engenhão) are also under threat of forced relocation. The city government has made critical (and unconstitutional) changes to the plano director (master plan) of the city, allowing gross exceptions to zoning laws that have set off a real estate frenzy in the Jacarepaguá and Port regions.
The city has also begun the process of occupying strategic favelas with shock troops. This is causing other kinds of problems, such as gun battles in the streets, burning buses, and the closing of commercial zones.
There are 6 years until the Rio Olympics. As I mentioned in a previous post, there are myriad problems with hosting a mega-event, the majority of which the city, state, and national governments appear to be content to ignore in favor of advancing private interests, city marketing, and imposing temporary solutions to Rio’s grave problems with physical, economic, political, and social infrastructures.
Observações e perguntas em resposta ao trabalho do campo Engenhão
O estádio tem mais nomes que qualquer outro estádio do Rio: Estádio Olímpico João Havelange, Engenhão, Vazião (porque nem a torcida do Botafogo vai ao estádio) e Stadium Rio. Adicionamos “Fechadão” a lista. Como o Maracanã e HSBC Arena, o estádio é muito difícil entrar sem pagar. Para fazer visitas escolares e/ou pesquisas académicas tem que armar o ataque durante muito tempo, ter a paciência de um santo e a persistência de Sisiphus.
Também chamamos o estádio Fechadão porque ele é rodeado por cercas e muros empenetráveis. Só vimos um guarda guardando uma porta, e ele trabalha por uma empresa privada de segurança contratado por Botafogo (supostamente).
Perguntamos como entrar, e ele me deu o mesmo número de telefone que eu já tinha ligado dez vezes (Departimento de Marketing de Botafogo 2543-7272). É também notável que o estádio não tinha linha telefônica aberto ao publico em quando o departimento responsável pelo estádio mudou seu escritório lá. Até hoje não existe como dar um toque ao estádio.
Também podemos assertar que o estádio merece o nome Fechadão porque suas vias de acesso e dispersão são bem limitadas. O barrio tem vias estreitas e sinuosas. Nao obstante que a Linha Amarela passa perto é difícil chegar de carro. Chegar de trem da mais certo, mas o estação só tem uma saída. A situação de clássicos complica o transito ainda mais. Controlar o espaço do entorno para dirigir torcidas rivais é um grande desafio pela policia.
O Fechadão é monumental em muitos aspetos. Seu custo de R$400.000.000 (sete vezes acima do orçamento) foi um gasto monumental. O metal, plastico e concreta brilham na luz. Sendo o prédio mais alto por muitos andares, o estádio domina o paisagem de região. Agora é mais difícil se perder na rua. Da para ver ele de longe, não está na moita, deixando rabo sair. Seus arcos são elegantes e o tieto que cobre milhares de metros quadrados parece leve. O que esta dizendo o estádio? Sua monumentalidade comunica mensagems de modernidade, exclusividade, espectacularidade, desenvolvimento, reestruturação e reterritorialização urbano. O estádio é também um símbolo do clube, do bairro, de poder politico, de uma falta de planejamento urbano, o futuro palco dos Jogos Olímpicos, esperança, fé e confiança num futuro bem certinho.
O que é o afeito local?
Aumento de sensação térmica. Não existem refúgios de sombra no entorno do estádio.
Pavimento das ruas e calcadas abeirando o estádio. Os melhoramentos não estenderam ao barrio.
Dia de jogo, moradores abrem negócios temporários, lucram até R$12.000 extra por ano. Não são permitidos os camelôs no entorno. Eles ficam no outro lado de ferro estrada onde também não foram feitos melhoramentos urbanísticos.
Inflação de valor immobilaria e de aluguel. Não é claro ainda o que aconteceu com as comunidades ao outro lado de ferro estrada.
Encarando o estádio e ao lado do comunidade carente Belém-Belém, a empresa Santa Cecilia (www.santacecilia.net, 3206-2930) comprou um espaço arborizado que foi alugado por festas privadas. A mesma empresa construiu um condomínio em frente do Parque Aquatico Maria Lenk em Jacarepaguá. Pode significar uma concentração de especulação imobilario e/ou uma empresa sábia que comprou uns terrenos que não vão perder valor na decorrer aos Jogos Olímpicos.
Foi notável a quantidade de pixação e grafiti nas paredes. O entorno do estádio é um paisagem de contrastes arquitectônicos, históricos e sócio-econômicos.
O estádio não creou espaço de lazer pela cidadão. Ao contrário, antes do estádio havia um campo de futebol no entorno. Botafogo não permite o público utilizar o estádio de jeito nenhum.
Não melhorou os negócios do entorno. Num lugar só, trés bares abriram e fecharam em dois anos. Se o estádio só pertence ao Botafogo, como hoje, ao máximo sediará 35-40 jogos por ano. É bastante difícil lucrar tanto em poucos dias. Pior ainda é que o acesso de trem passa de estação pelo portão sem enfrentar bar, restaurante ou serviço nenhum.
Perguntas claves pelo futuro:
As vias de acesso jamais vão sorportar 40.000 torcedores chegando por muito jogos em pouco tempo. Durante o Campeonato Carioca 2011 e pelos jogos Olímpicos aconteceria muito. Então, para reformar as vias de acesso, teriam que fazer um intervenção urbanística massiva – o que e como será?
Enredando o estádio pela saída do trem esta o velho centro de ferrocarilles. O terreno e os prédios pertencem ao governo federal. Os prédios antigos são poucos utilizados, espaço perdido, decadente. Para tornar o estádio mas útil, seria necessário fazer algo criativo e lucrativo com esse espaço. Existe planejamento por o projeto? Quando começariam trabalhar lá?
Os estádios do Rio de Janeiro estão virando tomar seu antiga forma? Ao princípio do século XX, estádios só perteneceriam os ricos, brancos, elites e idosos. Eles demarcavam um espaço privado, exclusivo, encerrado, defendido e fechado. Só podia entrar quem pertencia a aquele espaço, com seus gostos, dinheiro, hábitos, métodos do transporte e cor de pele. Todos os estádios novos, construído pela Pan 2007 são fechados ao propósito. O Maracanã é muito mais fechado que antes. Todos viravam espaços financiados pelo bolso publico mas dominados por interesses privados. O padrão do estádio (pós)-moderno é esso: cada vez mais caro, espetacular, monumental, separado, exclusivo e muito menos accessível. Existe outro caminho ao futuro?
Obrigado a Ana Elise Coelho para nos acompanhar e informar sobre a historia do Fechadão. Muitas de essas observações foram feitas por ela através de suas pesquisas. Também nos acompanhou Rômulo dos Santos Machado, Tricolor doente.
The 2014 World Cup is four and a half years away and Brazilian officials have promised to build or renovate twelve stadiums to meet FIFA’s universalizing, consumerist, clientelist exigencies. For a country that is football mad but does not have one stadium capable of hosting a World Cup match (according to FIFA), the ExpoEstádio is happening at just the right moment, uniting sellers of stadium components with buyers and builders of stadiums.
The stadium buyers are the Brazilian public. Lula’s government has promised R$400 million for each stadium (400x12=R$4.8 billion). The builders of stadiums vary from privately held entities in Porto Alegre (Estádio Beira-Rio of Internacional F.C.) to municipalities (Belo Horizonte) to state governments (Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, etc). The ExpoEstádio gives us a glimpse of the form and function of stadiums in Brazil for the 2014 World Cup.
For me, the most interesting aspect of the Expo was seeing a stadium completely dismantled into is various elements and spread around an exhibition hall. No element was unrepresented, save for the vending of hotdogs and drinks by mobile vendors. On display were highway crash barriers, huge roadside information signs, traffic flow mechanisms, parking monitoring devices, reflective vests for parking attendants, ticketing mechanisms, turnstiles, metal detectors, metal roofing, plastic roofing, tubular roofing, retractable roofing, drainage systems, security systems, alarms, security cameras, personal identification technologies, synthetic grass, real grass, floodlights, sound systems, plastic seats, vinyl seats, vip seats with cup holders, two way mirrors, structural steel supports, laminate covers for things unheard of, recycling technologies, toilets, point of sale niceties, covered seating for teams and trainers, etc.
The experience of the Expo hall was akin to seeing one's stadium experience segmented into its physical and technological components. From the car or bus journey to the textrure of the seat, the sounds and sights, and the million invisible things that comprise the urban matrix. A bit frightening in some way.
As with most expos of this kind the information was a bit overwhelming and it was difficult to discern who the target audience was for all of these goods. After asking around I discovered that many of the people in attendance were associated with one or another project for the World Cup or were trying to get in on the stadium boom that is apparently coming to Brazil. Some lamented that it may be too late, others were clearly impressed by the four or five different companies that sell the same kind of plastic seat.
The Expo placed the modern stadium [read: E. Asian-Euro-North American] on display in a unique form, presenting a disaggregated toolbox of options for clubs, cities, and states to choose from. As these stadium projects start to leave paper in the coming months in preparation for the 2014 World Cup (albeit without the public audiences and necessary guarantees of transparency and open bidding for contracts) it will be instructive to see how the form and function of Brazilian stadiums change in relation to the rapid integration of the technologies and techniques on display at ExpoEstádio.
Umas das coisas mais revelantes dos Jogos Olímpicos é que eles nos oferecerem um pacote espaço-temporal que nos permite entender determinados padrões do mundo. Por exemplo, os Jogos de Los Angeles 1984 cumpriram o papel de fortalecer o rôl de capital privado em determinar a forma e jeito de megaeventos, e a retirada do setor público refletiu a onda Reaganiana de privatizar servicos públicos. Desde então os jogos têm sido cada vez mais comercializados e utilizados tanto para o city marketing quanto para a inserção de regiões urbanas na econômia global ou como mecanismos para estimular o orgulho da cidade em alcançar metas políticas mais pragmáticas (Alemanha 1936, Moscou 1980). A Copa do Mundo de 1994 nos EUA também marcou uma transição para um modelo mais capitalista / corporativa da FIFA, que têm consolidado sua posisção hegemônica sobre o jogo global desde aquele evento. Nada contra os estadunidenses, mas esses dois eventos marcaram as maiores transições nas maneiras em que os megaeventos são conceitualizados, produzidos e consumidos.
Nick Paumgarten, escrevendo na revista New Yorker em 2009, comentou que as espetaculares cerimônias de abertura e encerramento dos jogos chineses, além de ser uma chocante festa de debutante, podem ser entendidas como o climax de uma época caracterizada pelo consumismo desenfreado da mão de obra chinesa por consumidores europeus e norte-americanos. O “show de bola” dos chineses marcou o fim sinfôncio daquele era porque foi logo depois de que as luzes do Estádio Nacional apagavam que a economía global fugiu do ninho.
Também não foi longo depois das ceremônias de fechamento em 2008 que os organizadores dos jogos de Londres 2012, fazendo seu melhor representação de Hugh Grant, començou limitar as expectativas de seu performanance. Com a economía global em plena queda, gastando dezenas de bilhões de libras em infraestrutura esportiva deixa de ser uma boa ideia. Entre o competição pelos jogos de 2016.
Depois de chegar em quinto lugar de sete candidatos de algum jeito o Rio pulou sobre Doha para entrar a ronda final de candiatura. Desde então, o RJOGOC (Rio de Janeiro Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games) embarcou numa campanha de marketing global para sua candidatura cujo valor já superou R$100 milhões. Obviamente, seus esforços tem sido bastante exitosos, levando o Rio ganhar os jogos.
Os argumentos principais que utilizavam o RJOCOG para cediar os jogos no Rio são emocionais (ver video abaixo), baseado numa visão da cidade calamitosamente limitada e idealizada. No seu incansável promoção da candidatura, Presidente da Silva tem esperneado numa fúria adolescente, dizendo “não é justo” por que os outros paises já cediaram os jogos e agora “é a vez” do Rio de Janeiro. O questão de “justiça” aqui está equivocada, dado que a Caixa Federal subsidirá dezenas de hoteis de 3 a 4 estrelas em cuando mais que 1.2 milhão de pessoas moram em mais que 950 favelas na cidade. O video faz das tripas coração para tocar espectador e apresenta o Rio como uma combinação sensual de tesoros culturais e naturais.
Não quero dizer que o Rio não seja isso também. Mais, é que aquele encapsulamento só mostra uma parte bem limitada da Zona Sul e não diz nada. Não há duvida que o Rio tem beleza natural e uma vibrante cultura popular e esportiva. Mais, não há duvida que o Rio seja perigroso e disfuncional. Nas semanas recém-passadas vivemos incidentes de bandidos fazendo arrastraões em túneis, moradores de apartamentos sequestrados, assaltos em restaurantes, transporte público queimado por traficantes, furtos, robos e escandolos governmentais (além da luta mortal cotidiana entre traficantes e policía). A bahia de Guanabara é suja demais, transito sempre está engarrafado e só 15%-20% das escolas publicas têm equipamento ou espaços de lazer. O RJOCOG sempre fala “O Rio precisa os jogos mais que os outros” – surgindo que se o Rio não tem ganhado, o situação na cidade sigue feliz da mesma forma? Ou, como suregiu Lula, sediar os jogos seria bom para auto-estemo do povo brasileiro. É cada vez mais dificil levar-lo a serio.
A parte séria da candiatura é o orçamento e a maneira em que o RJOCOG pensa em transformar a cidade. Os tres niveis de governo já garantiam orçamento de R$28,8 bilhões. Rodrigo Zeitan, economista da Unigranrio diz: “Não existe orçamento que não é estourado. Falar que um orçamento está estourado é dizer nada. As perguntas principais são: quanto e por que?” Sim duvida nenhuma esse foi o caso dos Jogos Pan Americanos 2007, cuando os governos de cidade e estado gastou 1000% (dez vezes) de orçamento previsto, eventualmente chegando a R$3.5 bilhões. O processo de construcção foi chieo de escandolos de corrupção, projetos incompletos e eventualmente, a privitização de quasi todas as instalações esportivas. Agora que o Rio sediará os jogos podemos anticipar gastos publicos entre R$40 e R$50 bilhões. Bilhões gente. As mesmas pessoas estão encargadas, o que será diferente? O orçamento do Rio foi mais que os outros tres candidatos sumados, e considerando que a maioria das instalações já existe, a situação levanta mais questões que um exército de mendigos.
O consenso no Rio é que os Jogos transformarão a cidade, mais ninguém sabe como. O modelo de transformação urbano e social é Barcelona 1992, sem duvida uma olimpíada que afetou muito a cidade. Não obstante, Barcelona é uma cidade pequena de 1.5 milhões e tem um área urbano relativamente pacto e fica perto aos maiores centros turisticos no mundo. A Espanha recebe mais que 50 milhões de visitas touristicas cada ano, e é o segundo no mundo depois de Françia, à 200km distancia de Barcelona. O Brasil está em 41˚ lugar, entre a Índia e a Austrália, atraendo apenas um milhão de visitas mais que a República Domincana. Então, o reestruturação urbana de Barcelona pelos Jogos de 1992 foi só um elemento num processo de desenvovimento muito maior, que aconteceu durante anos e não foi um só evento com a intenção lançar a cidade aos holoflotes globais. Os problemas do Rio não emergiam numa noite e não disaparecerão de aqui há seis anos. O orçamento em sistemas de segurança de US$293,599,000 que antecede aos jogos é testemunho que o RJOCOG tem conhecimento que nem todos queriam ser “transformados” pelos jogos.
Os Jogos Olímpícos do Rio são baseados no idéia que gastando bilhões em infraestrutura esportiva, turistica e de transportes, de alguma maneira vai transformar o crecendo abismo entre os ricos e os pobres. Mais, os lugares alvados pelo investimento e “transformação” já são ricos (falo assim entendendo que qualquer lugar em Rio pois bem mais cumplicidade que aquela duplicidade rico-pobre). Por limitar o visão da cidade à municipalidade do Rio (6.1 milhões) e não incluir a região metropolitana (12.3 milhões), o RJOCOG assinalou o seu deseo concentrar o desenvolvimento em regiões que menos precisam dele (sem falar das favelas no ambiente Olímpico). Entretanto, as mudanças prevista pela zona portuaria e investimentos nos chamados “elefantes brancos” nos bairros de Jacareparaguá e Barra de Tijuca inevitávelmente benificiarão o sector immobilário, deslocando moradores de baixa renda e creando paisagems de consumo.
Mapa: Rio Olímpico vs. Rio Metropolitano. Não existe nenhum linha de transporte que ligará os suburbios da zona norte e Baixada Fluminese ao paisagem Olímpica onde o sistema de transporte é bastante precario. As linhas propostas incluem uma linha de metrô novo e os demais seriam linhas de BRT (Bus Rapid Transit). A dependência em technologia de transporte pouco modificada desde o século XIX caracteriza os plans do Rio e provavelmente exacerbará os graves problems de transito na cidade e causaria um impacto prejuicosa meio ambiental.
Os três niveles de governo já firmaram um acordo e legislavam a respeito da criação da Autoridade Público Olímpico (APO). A APO (já existente) tem o poder de utilizar o orçamento de R$28,8 bilhões, adquirir terreno atraves de desapropriação e coordinar a segurança por um período de dez anos. Isto representa nada menos que a instauração de um regime autoritário, autorizado e financiado pelo propio governo com a meta de reformar a paisagem social e fisica da ciadade em concordância com planos elaborados sem discusão público (por exemplo, IPPUR/FERJ, o principal centro de planajamento urbano do Rio não foi consultado). O COI demanda control centralizada sobre o producção dos seus jogos. Também demanda orçamento garantido de mutíciples nivels do governo. O Rio estava bem no frente dessas demandas, senalando há muito tempo que qualquer solitição de COI seria cumprido com gusto. O monstro APO está vivo já e os tres niveis do governo estão estudando o que fazer com seu Frankenstein.
O video acima é impresionante na sua interpretação da cidade, mais emquanto eu me sento aqui em meu apartamento no nono andar com uma vista da baía de Guanabara, a brisa está levando o cheiro de polução ao meu cuarto. As instalaçòes previstas da Marina da Gloria serim dificeles levar ao cabo dado ao seu entombamento e resistência dos moradores, mas o empresário Eike Batista está disposto gastar R$150 milhões no projeto. Também são dignos de questionamento os eventos em Copacabana e na Lagoa, devido à densidade de população e o problema crônico de transporte. Pior ainda, a maioria das instalações serão construidos numa zona de Jacarepaguá e Barra de Tijuca que é umida, pantanosa e ecologicamente frágil. A Villa Pan já sofreu problemas graves na sua estrutura apenas dois anos após a inaguração. Temos alguma razão para acreditar que as instalações para os Jogos Olímpicos seriam diferentes?
Em qualquer Olimpíada (Los Angeles 1984 aparte), pode-se considerar o investimento público massivo como um desinvestimento parcial em outras prioridades socias e urbanas. No caso do Rio de Janeiro, a escala de investimento planejado (e garantido pelo governo) é tão grande que as “transformações” sociais e espacias exacerbarão as desigualidades já existentes por mais um geração, uma vez que os espaços, quando transformados e concretizados, têm tendencia a formar e reificar relações sociais.
É muito facil ser crítico de movimento Olímpico e das maneiras em que os políticos brasileiros tenham postulado o país e a cidade no ambito interncaional para trazer os jogos ao Rio. Os Jogos Olímpicos transformaram-se em um monstro com fome de dinheiro. Um possivel motivo para não ceidar os Jogos em Madri foi porque eles já tinham 78% das instalações construidos, diminuindo a ncessidade por um orçamento maior. Como foi o caso em Barcelona, Sidney, Atenas, e Pequim, os jogos modernos permanetemente transformando as cidades onde caem. Os Chineses até incorporavam o Ninho de Passaro eo Cubo d’Água na pasigem antigua e celestial de seu capital. No seu deseo cego de trazer eventos internacionais ao Rio, para para se expor como numa vitrine (com a meta principal de atraer turistas internacionais e capital global), o COB e os três niveis de governo consistentemente negavam pensar na cidade em sua totalidade. O resultado, em 2007, foi a acirramento das desigualidades sociais e espaçias, enriquecimento das cartolas e das redes de empresários e uma falta geral de transparência na contablidade e democracia. Ainda que os legados do Pan não tinham sido completamente negativos, a sociedade carioca tem que ficar atenta que desta vez as instalações não sejam privatizadas e para que o largo processo de preparação será democratizado.
Lindo as cetenas de paginas de dossiê da candidatura (o cual já se tournou o plan mestre da cidade), não existe menção de preservação o investimento cultural, nenhum indicação como vão estimular participação publico em esportes olímpicos de base pra acima, pouco investimento em educação, nem um assesorio honesto ao que é que necessita tão desesperadamente (nem fala de violência). Os livros de candiatura presentam um versão de realidade embranqueada e disfarça o que poderia ser a meta final dos jogos: transformar o Rio de Janeiro á uma cidade “espectacular” e global que esta marcada por uma clase operário dócil, barata e immovil; uma cidade com paisagems iconograficas com comodidades culturais para turistas internacionais; um local onde grandes impresas (clientes da cidade empresarial) internacionais pode negociar com lucro e tranquilidade; e cada vez mis a construcção de uma cidade ser consumida e experiênciada, não criada e vivida. Esso tem sido a trajetôria da cidade desde o primer mandato de Cesar Maia na década de 1990s e os Jogos Olímpicos podem representar o culminação de um amplo processo de re-imaginação e re-estruturamento socioespaçial da cidade. Como falei, é facil ser cínico, mas as mesmas palavras deles contam a historia:
Agora, o trabalho dificil é encontrar um jeito de transformar a Olimpíada numa coisa que vai benificiar a cidade em sua totalidade e não só para algumas sectores da cidade e segmentos da população. Mesmo o caso de Barcelona 1992 que fooi tomado como o modelo mais bem-sucedido, também existiram problemas graves com a transformação da cidade. No Rio, a tarefa de solucionar os milésimas problemas da cidade atraves de megaeventos seriá ainda mais dificil dado a falta de transparência e de processos de controle social (marcas registradas de COI e da FIFA), o quase completa hegemonía do Rede Globo, a ausência de movimentos de resistência nos ambientes electrônicos e redes sociais e os poderosos discursos de esporte e o movimento Olímpico que condenam as vozes de oposisção em categorias de “anti-patriotico”, “anti-progressista”, ou “extrema esquerda”.
O processo de construir, sediar, entregar os legados e sobrevivir aos jogos durará uma década. A tarefa de lutar por uma olimpíada mais inclusiva e democrática començou no 2 de outoubro. Os movimentos socias da cidade e pais têm que articular bem claramente como pretendem inserir-se no processo de construir a cidade olímpica para trazer os beneficios de o nivel historico de investimentos ao maior publico possivel.
On Friday October 2 the International Olympic Committee votes on the host city for the 2016 Summer Olympics, do you know where your president or prime minister is? If you are Brazilian, Spanish, Japanese or USAmerican, your democratically eleced leader is in Copenhagen, Denmark lobbying to install an authoritarian Olympic regime in Rio, Madrid, Tokyo or Chicago. One of the most interesting aspects of Olympic Games is that they offer tidy space-time bundles that allow us to understand larger trends in the world. For instance, the 1984 Games in Los Angeles are generally considered to have stimulated the role of private capital in determining the form and function of mega-events, and the retreat of the public sector reflected the Reaganite wave of privatizing public services. Since 1984 the games have been increasingly commercialized and utilized as much for city marketing and the insertion of urban regions into the global economy as they have been for civic pride or attaining pragmatic political ends (Germany 1936, Moscow 1980). The 1994 World Cup in the USA also marked a transition to a more fully capitalistic / corporatist model for FIFA, which has since consolidated its hegemony over global soccer. Nothing against the USAmericans here, but those two events marked major transitions in the ways that mega-events are conceptualized, produced and consumed. Nick Paumgarten, writing in the New Yorker in 2009, commented that the insanely spectacular, hyper-organized, and "we're here, look out" message of the Beijing opening and closing ceremonies can also be understood as the symbolic and functional money shot of an era characterized by unbridled consumption of cheap Chinese labor by the USA and Europe. The show de bola (as the Brazilians say) of the Chinese also marked the symphonic end of that era, as it wasn't long after the lights in the Bird's Nest went out that the global economy flew the coop. It also wasn't long after the closing ceremonies in 2008 that the organizers of the London Games, doing their best Hugh Grant impersonation, started to limit expectations of their performance. With the global economy in free fall, spending tens of billions of pounds on sports infrastructure no longer seemed like such a great idea. Enter the competition for the 2016 Games. After finishing in fifth place amongst seven candidates, Brazil somehow leaped over Doha to enter the final round of candidature. Since then, the Rio Organizing Committee (RJOGOC) has embarked on a 50 million dollar campaign to market its bid around the world. The effort has been remarkably successful, propelling Rio to the role of favorites according to gamesbids.com and aroundtherings.com Rio's primary arguments for hosting the games are emotional (see video below), based in a woefully idealized vision of a very small segment of the city. In his tireless promotion of the Rio bid, President da Silva has been stomping his feet in adolescent fury, saying that it's simply "not fair" that other countries have hosted the games and that it's Rio's turn. The question of "fairness" here is misplaced, given that if Rio wins the bid it will heavily subsidize the construction of dozens of 3 and 4 star hotels while more than 1.3 million people live in 950+ favelas scattered throughout the city. The video does gnaw at the heartstrings, however, and presents Rio as a sensual combination of cultural and natural treasures. This is not to say that Rio isn't all of those things, but rather that this encapsulation doesn't actually say anything. There is no question that Rio has natural beauty and a vibrant popular and sporting culture but it is also beyond doubt that it is dangerous and dysfunctional. In the past few weeks there have been several incidents of bandidos robbing cars stopped in tunnels, kidnapping and robbing entire apartment blocks, buses falling off overpasses, and assaults in restaurants (in addition to the daily mortal combat between police and drug traffickers). The bay is polluted, traffic is constantly snarled, and only 15-20% of public schools have recreation areas. The RJOGOC has repeatedly said that "Rio needs this, the others don't" - meaning that if Rio doesn't get the games, the situation in the city will continue along its merry way? Or, as Lula suggested the other day, hosting the Games will be good for Brazilian self-esteem. It's increasingly difficult to take the man seriously. The serious part of Rio's bid is the budget and the ways in which the RJOCOG envisions transforming the city. The federal, state and city governments have combined to guarantee a budget of R$ 28 billion. As Rodrigo Zeitan, an economist at Rio's Unigranrio university told me a couple of weeks ago, "There's no such thing as coming in at budget. It simply can't happen. To say that a budget went over the proscribed amount is to say nothing at all." This was certainly true in the case of the 2007 Pan American Games, when the city and state governments of Rio were 10 times (1000%) over budget, eventually spending about R$ 3.5 billion. The building process was fraught with corruption scandals, incomplete projects, and the eventual privatization of all but a few venues (and those are not currently being used). If Rio wins, we can expect to see public spending in the range of R$ 40-50 billion along with similar post-games privatization schemes. Rio's bid is larger than all of the other bids combined, which, when one considers that many of the venues are already built begs more questions than an army of street children. The consensus in Rio is that the Games are going to transform the city but no one really knows how. The model for urban and social transformation is Barcelona 1992, an Olympics that undoubtedly had a major impact on that city. However, Barcelona is a city of only 1.6 million in a relatively compact area and close to major tourist centers (Spain is the second most popular tourist destination in the world, just behind neighboring France, Brazil ranks 41st, between Australia and India, drawing just one million more visits than the Dominican Republic). Therefore, Barcelona's makeover for the Olympics was one element in a much larger process of development and economic restructuring, not a one off infusion intended to launch the city into the global spotlight. Rio's problems did not emerge overnight and they will not disappear in the six years leading up to the Olympics. The US$ 293,599,000 outlay for security leading up to the Games (RCOGOC Bid Book, Theme 13, p. 29)is evidence that the RJOCOG is well aware that not everyone might want to be "socially transformed" by the Olympics. Rio's candidature is based in the idea that spending lavishly on sporting, tourist, and transportation infrastructure will somehow transform the growing gap between the rich and poor. Yet the very places in which the majority of the "transformation" will take place are already wealthy. By limiting the vision of the city to the municipality of Rio (6.1 million) and not including the greater metropolitan area (12.3 million), the RJOGOC has signaled its intent to concentrate development in the regions that need it the least. Additionally, the planned changes to the port area, and added investments in suburban regions such as Jacarepagua and Barra de Tijuca will inevitably benefit the real estate sector, displacing lower income residents and ushering in landscapes of consumption. The greater Rio metro area vs. the Olympic City. There is not one proposed transportationn line that would link the northern suburbs (Baixada Fluminese) to the Olympic landscape. The proposed transport lines include one new subway line and the remainder will be RBT (Rapid Bus Transit) lines. The dependence on 19th century transportation technology characterizes Rio's bid and will likely serve to exacerbate prodigious traffic problems in the city. Three levels of government have already passed legislation to construct the Public Olympic Authority (APO), which will have the power to manage the budget, acquire land through eminent domain, and will coordinate security services for a period of ten years. This is nothing short of the installation of an authoritarian regime that is empowered and funded by the government to reshape the social and physical landscapes of the city according to plans that were drawn without public input (for instance, IPPUR, the main regional planning center at the Federal University of Rio was not consulted). The IOC demands centralized control over the production of its Games. It also demands gauaranteed financing from multiple levels of government, something that until recently had stalled the Chicago bid. Wherever the 2016 games land on Friday, there will be an authoritarian regime directing the form and function of that city for at least the next 6 years. The above video is impressive in its rendering of the city, but even as I sit here in my 9th floor apartment overlooking Guanabara Bay, the wind is bringing the stink of pollution. The installations for the sailing competition in the Marina da Gloria will be difficult to complete (due to its legal status as a protected area), as will the proposed events in Copacabana and Lagoa, as these are two of the most densely populated areas in the hemisphere. Additionally, the majority of the facitities are planned for Barra / Jacareapagua which is a swampy wetland with unstable subsoil. The Pan American village has suffered terrible structural and engineering problems in the two years since its construction. There is no reason to expect that the Olympic constructions will be any different. In any Olympics (save LA 1984), the massive public investment can be considered a partial disinvestment in other social and urban priorities. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the scale of planned investment is such that the social and spatial "transformations" will likely exacerbate existing inequalities for the next generation. It's easy to be cynical of the Olympic Movement and the ways in which Brazilian politicians have been posturing on the national and international stage to bring the Games to Rio. The Olympics have become a cash hungry monster, permanently transforming the cities in which they land. The Chinese even incorporated the Bird's Nest and Water Cube into the celestial order of old Beijing. In their blind desire to attract international events in order to put Rio de Janeiro and Brazil in the international shop window (with the goal of attracting global capital and tourists), the Brazilian Olympic Committee and all three levels of government in Brazil have consistently neglected to take the larger city into account. The result, in 2007, was the re-enforcement of spatial and social inequalities, the propagation of a good ol' boys network of contractors and politicians that made off with billions, and a general lack of transparency, accountability, and democracy. In reading through the hundreds of pages of plans for the city, there is no mention of cultural preservation / investment, no indication of stimulating public participation in sport, no investment in education (English for taxi drivers, for instance), no honest assessment of what it is in Rio that is in such desperate need of transformation. The bid books present a whitewashed reality that disguises what very well might be the larger economic and political ends of the games: transform Rio de Janeiro into a "spectacular" global city that is marked by a docile, cheap, and immobile labor force, iconographic landscapes and cultural facilities for international tourists, the locus of multi-national corporations (along with their haute bourgeois workforce) and increasingly, a city to be experienced and consumed, not lived and created. This has been the trajectory of the political economy of the city since the mid-1990s and the Olympics might represent the culmination of this re-imagining and socio-spatial restructuring of the city. The difficult work is finding ways to turn the opportunity of the Olympics into something that really will benefit the city. Barcelona was successful and is the paradigmatic best case scenario to date, but there were major problems as well. In Rio, this task will be even more difficult because of the lack of transparency and democratic process (hallmarks of Olympic regimes), the nearly complete hegemony of the OGlobo media network, the absence of organized social movements vis a vis electronic and social networks, and the powerful discourses of sport and the Olympic movement that turn opposition voices into categories of "non-patriotic", "anti-progressive", or "radical fringe". If Rio does win the bid on Friday, it will be a long and trying struggle to keep the decade long process of constructing, hosting, and delivering the legacy of the Olympics in the light of day, avoiding the pitfalls and pratfalls of the 2007 Pan American Games. The existing social movements must articulate very clearly how they plan to insert themselves into the process of building the Olympic City in order to bring the benefits of this historic level of investment to the city at large. Rio de Janeiro 29 September 2009 p.s. Below is the first video produced by Rio 2016. Note the difference in emotional tone and slickness of presentation between this video and the final version above.
Fluminese 1 x Coritiba 3 Campionato Brasileiro, Serie A Maracanã 16 August 2009
For many years, when I told people that my research was "stadiums in Latin America", the inevitable response was, "Have you ever been to that huge stadium, I can't remember its name, but it holds, like, four hundred thousand people, that must be crazy." The name of the stadium is Estádio Mario Filho, aka Maracanã. Yes, I have been there, many times, and it doesn't hold nearly as many people as it used to. It can be crazy though it’s also just a local stadium where people go week in, week out to watch soccer.
The Maracanã is arguably the most famous stadium in the world. Built for the 1950 World Cup, the original capacity was somewhere between 180,000 and 190,000. The Brazilians were so sure that they were going to win the 1950 World Cup that they offered to paint this colossus, the biggest stadium in the world, the grandest stadium since Imperial Rome’s Circus Maximus, the stadium that was to represent Brazil’s emergence as South America’s post World War II industrial, technological, and cultural leader – in the colors of the winning team. On 16 July 1950, 220,000 people witnessed the unthinkable. To this day the Maracana is celeste, the sky-blue of Uruguay a continual reminder of the folly of hubris. It is surprising that so few Brazilians know the story behind the colors.
Despite the infamy and drama, going to the Maracanã is really just an ordinary thing to do on a Sunday afternoon in Rio. I arrived late to the game but there were so many others doing the same that I wondered if the kickoff hadn’t been delayed. I bought my R$20 ($US 12) ticket for the cadeira comum and hustled into the stadium. Fluminese were a goal down after fifteen minutes and the fans were clearly angry. There wasn’t much to recommend in the play of either team – Fluminese entered the game second from bottom and Coritiba third from bottom. This was a mid season relegation battle.
Before half-time, I moved from behind the goal to behind the player’s benches and below the media cabins. This is usually the most crowded section of the stadium as the fans are within earshot of the coaches and players. When I first started going to the Maracanã in 2003, this area was known as the geral, an open area where young men ran back and forth screaming at the players, coaches, and referees. The geral was eliminated in 2006, reducing the capacity of the stadium to 87,000 (from an already diminished 119,000) . Families have taken the place of the ruffians and it is no longer possible to watch the game form the railings as Military Police shunt everyone into seats before kickoff. This hasn’t stopped the streams of vitriol flowing from the stands to the pitch, but the police are omni-present.
One of the other changes that has come with the architectural modification is that prices have increased from R$5 to R$20. It literally goes without saying that when you put people in seats they become more sedate. But there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the former geral, now cadeira comum, continues as a place where the norms and mores of Brazilian society are transferred from one generation to the next. I can’t decide if it’s funny or not, but hearing dozens of pre-teen voices fill the air with “Oi juiz, vai tomar no cu!” (Hey referee, go take it up the ass!) is pretty funny.
One of the main differences between going to a stadium in Europe or the USA and Latin America is the amount of information about the event. At the Maracanã, there is a scoreboard but no game clock, no game day programs, no stats, no player profile magazines, nothing. People just know these things. There is also no place to buy souvenirs, and no half-time show. There is half-time entertainment, though it hardly compares in Lolita-esque sensuality with the RailHawk dancers. I hope to get an interview with this guy in the coming weeks. He goes the length of the pitch and then returns to midfield, which takes him about 15 minutes.
Fluminese went 2-0 down mid-way through the second half, thanks to some shocking defending and even worse goal-keeping. The newly reinstated coach, Renato Gaucho, clearly had nothing and no one to bring off the bench and paced the sideline with his head in his hands. Somehow, a long ball out of defense combined with a lucky bounce and a bit of pace to pull a goal back for Fluminese, but hope was short lived as Coritiba killed the game on a counter-attack. Once the result was beyond doubt, the fans spilled into the old geral to take up their swearing positions. There was nothing the police could do but let the abuse wash over them and onto the coaching staff and players.
In the movie clip below, there is an impressive diversity of ages, all screaming “Frangeiro” which can be loosely translated as “chicken shit”. Those familiar with Monty Pyton will be surprised to see a cameo by the “It’s” man. Just another Sunday at the Maracanã.
07 August 2009
World Cup 2014 Memory Project
“A Copa é nossa, a memoria é global”
Overview
The FIFA World Cup is one of the world’s most powerful sources of collective memory. Every time a World Cup Final occurs, it is the most watched event in human history. World Cup games define national and personal histories, stimulate exchange between distant and disparate cultures, and renew rivalries that resonate through time and space. Since 1930, the quadrennial World Cup has marked time for billions of people, connecting generations and cultures through a shared memory.
The World Cup is a global event that occurs in local stadiums. These stadiums function as stages for sport but also serve as repositories of global memory. Players, coaches, dignitaries, residents, tourists, and television audiences share the emotional and cultural space of the stadium, remembering what happened there long after the floodlights dim. Despite the importance of the game and stadium in peoples’ lives, there are very few mechanisms through which they can build upon, share, and connect with the memories and events they helped to create. Long after the World Cup has passed, the stadiums and the games they host occupy a permanent position in the global memory of sport.
Twelve Brazilian cities will host the 64 games of the FIFA 2014 World Cup. Incredibly, there are currently no stadiums in Brazil that meet FIFA (International Federation of Association Football) requirements for the month long event. Therefore, the Brazilian Football Federation (CBF) in conjunction with national, state, and city governments have embarked upon an ambitious stadium building program. The minimum projected cost for seven renovated and five new stadiums is in excess of R$4.3 billion (US$ 2.15 billion). The estimated investment in transportation, communication, and tourist infrastructure is a staggering R$100 billion. The historic nature of the World Cup and its profound impact on Brazilian cities call for a project that can contextualize and memorialize these monumental projects.
The mission of the 2014 World Cup Memory Project (2014WCMP) is to document, enhance, and catalogue the histories and events associated with the stadiums of the 2014 World Cup. This unique project will serve as a resource and archive for laborers, project managers, government officials, residents, tourists, researchers, and policy makers. Multiple forms of public engagement will allow a diverse cross-section of Brazilian society to interact with international tourists so that the experience and events of the 2014 World Cup can be preserved as a living history.
In preparation for the 2007 Pan American Games, Rio de Janeiro invested heavily in sporting infrastructure. The urban and social legacies of the Pan 2007 are deeply ambivalent yet have positioned Rio de Janeiro and Brazil in a situation where more investment in sporting infrastructure is forthcoming.
Twelve Brazilian cities will host the 64 games of the FIFA 2014 World Cup. Incredibly, there are currently no stadiums in Brazil that meet FIFA (International Federation of Association Football) requirements for the month long event. Therefore, the Brazilian Football Federation (CBF) in conjunction with national, state, and city governments have embarked upon an ambitious stadium building program. The minimum projected cost for seven renovated and five new stadiums is in excess of R$4.3 billion (US$ 2.15 billion). The financing for the stadium projects and their associated tourist, communications, and transportation infrastructures will come from the public sector with significant contributions from private enterprise.
The World Cup is a global event that occurs in local stadiums. These stadiums function as stages for sport but also serve as repositories of global memory. Residents, tourists, and television audiences share the emotional and cultural space of the stadium, remembering what happened there long after the floodlights dim. Despite the importance of the game and stadium in peoples’ lives, there are very few mechanisms through which they can build upon, share, and connect with the memories and events they helped to create. Long after the World Cup has passed, the stadiums and the games they host occupy a permanent position in the global memory of sport. My 2014 World Cup Memory Project intends to augment and preserve this memory in multiple forms.
Brazil is also one of the four remaining candidate cities to host the 2016 Summer Olympics. On October 2, 2009 the IOC will make its choice between Rio, Tokyo, Madrid and Chicago. If Rio de Janeiro is chosen, the process of preparing for the Olympics will begin immediately, stimulating large scale construction projects thoughout the city. In the event that Rio is selected I anticipate beginning a longer-term project.
My research into mega-events in Rio de Janeiro will build upon my book, Temples of the Earthbound Gods (University of Texas Press, 2008). In Temples, I trace the development of soccer stadiums in Rio and Buenos Aires, situating the stadiums in their political, urban, and cultural contexts. The book was runner-up in the Association of American Geographers's Globe Book Award competition and was called a "damn fine geography book" by one of the reviewers. There is a permanent link to the book at the right of the page.
I am really excited about heading off to Rio for the rest of the year and hope that you subscribe to the blog so I can keep you posted on what I'm up to.
The years 2014 and 2016 may seem distant, but for Brazilians they are very much in the present.
In May of 2009, FIFA confirmed twelve Brazilian cities as hosts of the 2014 World Cup. Incredibly, there are no stadiums in Brazil that meet FIFA’s architectural specifications. In order to host the 2014 World Cup, Brasilia, Cuiaba, Curitiba, Fortaleza, Manaus, Natal, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio De Janeiro, Salvador, and Sao Paulo are building or renovating stadiums, constructing new hotels, upgrading transportation systems, and preparing for the quadrennial soccer tournament. Construction on all twelve projects will begin in 2010.
According to the Brazilian Soccer Confederation (CBF), the cumulative cost of the 2014 World Cup stadium projects will be R$ 4.648 billion ($2.32 billion Dollars). The average stadium project will cost around R$ 387.3 million ($190 million Dollars). Billions more will be spent on upgrading transportation infrastructure and communications facilities, building new hotels, and security. Host cities and states will bear the brunt of the financial burden as the current economic climate has reduced partnerships with the private sector.
On October 2, 2010 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) will select either Rio de Janeiro, Tokyo, Chicago, or Madrid as the host city for the 2016 Summer Olympics. GamesBids.com, the leading indicator of Olympic Games selection, places Rio de Janeiro in a dead heat with Tokyo. The Olympics have never been in South America and the Brazilian federal government has guaranteed financing for the R$80 billion project (US$40 billion). The Rio Organizing Committee (RJOGOC) has already spent in excess of US$ 100 million in preparing and promoting the Olympic bid. Rio de Janeiro has hooked its Olympic Bid to their experience with hosting the 2007 Pan American Games. The cumulative cost for the Pan 2007 was in excess of US$ 5 billion, more than ten times over budget. Hosting Pan 2007 was a process fraught with corruption scandals, incomplete projects, and militarization of parts of the city.
While politicians and construction firms see mega-events as opportunities to accelerate development projects and promote cities and country on a global stage, others point to the inevitable corruption, graft, and uneven distribution of financial burdens and rewards as evidence of continuing social injustices. The state and city of Rio de Janeiro continue to invest heavily in the constellation of facilities necessary to host global mega-events, using these events as mechanisms to accelerate social and economic development. Whether or not this works as a strategy for solving Rio’s grave social and urban problems is debatable. The evidence from the 2007 Pan American Games suggests that the promised new and/or improved transportation lines will not be completed, environmental remediation projects will stall, and that construction of vip accommodation in stadiums and five star hotels will take budgetary priority.
As a recipient of a Fulbright Scholar Grant from the U.S. Department of State, in the Fall of 2009 I will be researching the social and urban effects of mega-events in Rio de Janeiro and Brazil. My recent book, Temples of the Earthbound Gods (University of Texas Press, 2008), traces the history and culture of stadiums in Rio de Janeiro from the late 19th century to the early 21st. My current research is a continuation of the themes I cover in Temples: exploring the larger political, cultural, and geographic worlds of Brazilian cities through an analysis of their building projects relatative to the 2007 Pan American Games, 2014 World Cup, and 2016 Olympics. In addition to my research, I will teach a course on mega-events in the Department of Geography at the State University of Rio de Janeiro.
If your media outlet is in need of background information, interviews, or news stories from Rio de Janeiro, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Thank You,
Chris Gaffney
About Dr. Christopher Gaffney holds a PhD in Geography from the University of Texas at Austin and is on leave from UNC – Chapel Hill where he teaches Urban Geography and International Studies. His book, Temples of the Earthbound Gods: stadiums in the cultural landscapes of Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, is available on Amazon or from the University of Texas Press. Gaffney hosted a weekly talk show called Soccer Mad on 91.7 KOOP (Austin, TX), has been a radio and television commentator for the USL-1 Carolina RailHawks (Cary, NC), and covers the RailHawks for the Independent Weekly in Durham, NC. He covered the 2006 World Cup at www.soccerprofs.blogspot.com and maintains a blog at www geostadia.blogspot.com. He is also a principal of Six Dimensions Sports Consulting (www.6dsports.com). He can be reached at geostadia@gmail.com or by phone at 512-585-9866 (USA) or 011-55-21-xxxx-xxxx (Brazil).
